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POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIERS AND FOREIGN INVESTORS*
JOHN R. PATE**
AUTHOR'S NOTE: After this article had gone to press several
important events concerning the Andean Group occurred. Among
these events were the Andean Commission's approval of Decision
102, whereby Chile and the other members of the Andean Group
terminated their mutual obligations, and Decision 103, in which
several modifications were made to Decision 24. Although De-
cision 24 constitutes the foreign investment and technology
transfer code of the Andean Group, the modifications thereto
do not affect the substance or implementation of the technology
policies which are the principle focus of this article. Further
analysis of these events can be found at the end of the article
in the section entitled "Recent Developments."
The purpose of this article is to summarize current Venezuelan tech-
nology transfer policies and their implications for foreign technology
suppliers or direct foreign investors. However, the broader policies toward
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direct foreign investment (DFI) will be summarized as well since they
are inseparable from the question of technology transfer; or "commercial-
ization" as some would have it. Most readers will probably have a general
familiarity with the current Venezuelan legislation in this area, which is
basically the same as that for the other member countries of the Andean
Group,' but there have been several important recent decrees and new
proposals of which anyone contemplating a technology or investment
transaction in Venezuela should be aware.2 Furthermore, at the level of
the Andean Group, serious discussions aimed at drafting a common set
of regulations for the Group's common foreign investment code were
initiated in the last months of 1975. If approved, these would quite prob-
ably include rather significant modifications from the point of view of
foreign investors. 3 However, the principal focus here is on the technology
policies and the governmental entities which have been established to
implement them. In addition, focus will be on the results of the applica-
tion of these policies and some of the present implications of this new
national approach for technology suppliers and foreign investors in
Venezuela.
In this article, technology is referred to in its broadest sense as
encompassing both process and managerial technology. Obviously, in both
the design and application of Venezuela's technology policies these dis-
tinctions take on fundamental importance, particularly as it is implicitly
assumed that managerial technology is something less than real technology.
Both an appreciation of this perception, as well as an awareness of the
industrial and sectoral priorities for development, are necessary in order
to understand the overall thrust of Venezuela's policies in this area.
VENEZUELAN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LEGISLATION AND
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
Historical and Political Perspective
The treatment of direct foreign investment (DFI) in Venezuela is
governed by the several decisions covering DFI and technology transfer
of the Commission of the Andean Group (Acuerdo de Cartagena). How-
ever, Venezuelan legislation has differed from the norms in some import-
ant respects. This is due to several factors: the decisions reserved some
freedom of interpretation to the individual states; the decisions were the
subject of disagreement in some cases; and not all the decisions have
been fully ratified.
VENEZUELAN TECHNOLOGY POLICIES
The basic foreign investment policy of the Andean Group was
established by Decision 244 (as subsequently modified by Decisions 37,
37A, and 70) of December 1970, entitled the "Common Code for the
Treatment of Foreign Capital and Trademarks, Patents, Licences and
Royalties," which has received wide publicity in the last few years. When
Venezuela formally joined the group, it was obliged to adopt all of the prior
Decisions. Thus, Decision 24 entered into effect for Venezuela on Janu-
ary 1, 1974. This marked the initiation of a comprehensive and restrictive
DFI policy in Venezuela. However, it should be noted that in the several
years prior to its adherence to the Group, Venezuela had been studying
the possibility of unilaterally implementing a policy of this nature, re-
gardless of the outcome of its negotiations with the other five member
countries. In fact, Decision 24 was considered by the government planners
of the time to be one of the more attractive features of the Group for
Venezuela.
The Christian Democratic government of President Rafael Caldera,
recognizing the growing nationalist sentiments in the country, had created
a mixed commission to study the possibility of adopting such legislation
for Venezuela in 1971. This body, representing various political factions,
was naturally influenced by the recently approved Decision 24, as was
reflected in its proposal presented in 1972, and which would have been
in some respects even more restrictive than the Andean Code. (Venezuela
fully participated in all of the negotiations, which included the general
stance to be adopted toward DFI, leading to the formation of the Andean
Group in 1969. Except for strong internal political pressures exacted by
powerful national economic groups on the new Caldera administration,
Venezuela probably would have joined at that time.) However, the Caldera
Administration, unlike the present regime of President Carlos Andris
Prez, lacked a majority in Congress and was fearful of making an open
political issue of the policy toward foreign investment (on which a great
diversity of opinion still exists both within Venezuela and among the
members of the Andean Pact). Hence, it appeared convenient for Vene-
zuela to join the Group and thereby be "obliged" to accept not only
Decision 24 but also a number of the other economic and commercial
policy measures of the Group which appealed to the planners and which
were seen to be necessary for the economic development and moderniza-
tion of the country.
Before passing on to the subsequent Andean Group and national
legislation affecting DFI and technology, it should be observed that in
regard to the adoption of this general policy position in Venezuela there
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was relatively little difference between the major political factions. As is
now evident, the P6rez administration fully adopted and has continued to
implement the prevailing philosophy. In fact, Prez, with his strong elec-
toral majority and greatly increased petroleum revenues, has implemented
the policy more extensively and more rapidly than perhaps would other-
wise have been possible. This is reflected in the nationalization of the
iron and petroleum industries in 1974 and 1975, and in the reservation
of various key sectors, for state and/or national companies, such as steel,
petrochemicals, powdered milk, animal feed and possibly of food processing
and pharmaceuticals. Additionally, this philosophy is reflected in general
in a more restrictive or aggressive application of the Decision 24 prin-
ciples, which the country feels it can afford financially.
Andean and Venezuelan Legislation A ffecting DFI
Aside from Decision 24, as modified, the other two Decisions of the
Group which bear heavily on this issue are Numbers 84 and 85, approved
by the Commission in mid-1974, neither of which have been fully ratified
as yet by all of the members. Decision 845 established the basis for a
technology development policy in the Andean subregion grounded on a
series of guidelines and cooperative efforts. Among these guidelines are
several which relate directly to technology transfer which Venezuela has
begun partially to implement, as will be shown below. The other Decision,
Number 85,6 is the Common Industrial Property Code of the Group which
in some ways is more restrictive than previously accepted international
practice. Nevertheless, it does not differ substantially from such practice.
Thus far, Decision 85 has not been put into effect by any of the Andean
countries. In Venezuela it must be approved by the Congress where it has
been in committee for several months.7
With respect to Venezuelan national legislation establishing foreign
investment policy, several points should be mentioned. The Congressional
ratification of Venezuela's adherence to the Group was also an approval
of Decision 24,8 with its various modifications, and the potentially im-
portant Decision 46.9 Decision 46 established the basis for the formation
of subregional multinational companies in which foreign investors could
hold up to 40% of the equity."0 The Congress ratified the adherence in
September of 1973. However, the formal adherence procedure was not
completed until the end of December of that year, causing a delay in the
implementation of Decision 24, which did not become effective until
January 1, 1974.
VENEZUELAN TECHNOLOGY POLICIES
With the change in governments from Caldera to Perez occurring in
March 1974, it was not until the end of April that the Prez administra.
tion issued its two regulation Decrees, Numbers 62 and 63,11 creating the
governmental entity to administer the foreign investment policy and thus
effectively putting it into force. This agency, formally within the Ministry
of Development, 12 is the Superintendency of Foreign Investment (SIEX)
which will be examined in more detail below. These two Decrees basically
follow Decision 24, but there are a few noteworthy exceptions of great
importance to the question of technology transfer.
During the intervening year and a half since the new foreign invest-
ment policy was implemented, three new important measures have been
adopted broadening control over foreign investment, all of which are con-
sidered of doubtful constitutional validity. The first of these is Decree
7461" of February 1975 which adds additional prohibited clauses to the
list contained in Decision 24 and Decree 63 for technology contracts. In
one respect, Decree 746 significantly modifies the country's Industrial
Property Law of 1955, which otherwise, and until the approval of De-
cision 85, remains in force. The second is the Foreign Enterprise Trans-
formation Law, 14 approved by Congress in August 1975, which gives the
Superintendent of Foreign Investment broad authority to control the sale
of foreign held stock to national investors. Lastly, in October 1975, the
Cabinet approved Decree 122515 which transfers all foreign companies
and investments in or related to, the petroleum industry from the juris-
diction of SIEX and the Ministry of Development to a newly created
office within the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons. This law is of
particular interest because of its tendency to specialize, or "sectoralize,"
one type of industry, and because it requires that in cases where foreign
companies are transformed to mixed or national companies, only the State
or state companies may acquire the foreign stock.' 6
Finally, in the above context, the Superintendent has frequently re-
ferred to the preparation of two new decrees. One presumably would allow
foreign companies currently engaging in internal commerce and therefore
required to sell down to the category of national companies by May 1977,
to become principally manufacturing companies. Consequently, such for-
eign companies could remain foreign owned by a majority of shareholders.
The second proposed decree would attempt to legislate "true technology
transfer" and would refer to training programs and the like; in other
words, it would provide for the types of clauses to be included in tech-
nology contracts rather than listing clauses prohibited in such contracts
as in the legislation to date. The former decree has already been proposed
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to the President, but there have been certain legal disagreements within
the executive branch regarding it; the latter decree is still said to be under
study.
Substantive Rules Affecting Technology Transfer and DFI in Venezuela
The purpose of this section, and of the following section summarizing
recent foreign investment legislation at the subregional level, is merely to
highlight some of the more significant and newer features of the Andean
and Venezuelan legislation mentioned above. This is necessary for an
analysis of the implications for foreign technology suppliers and investors.
Although Decision 24 became law in Venezuela as of the beginning
of 1974, the new policy was not made effective until the end of April of
that year with the issuance of Decrees 62 and 63 establishing, by regula-
tion, the legal procedures for implementation. In Venezuela, it was decided
a separate decree would be issued covering Chapter III of Decision 24
(services and basic sectors), which is the subject of Decree 62. The reser-
vation for national enterprises, and the prohibition of new DFI, in the
areas of internal commerce and professional services (Art. 1) is of partic-
ular interest.
A foreign company is deemed to be engaged in internal commerce if
more than 49% of the products it sells in the country are not directly pro-
duced by it or if the products are produced in part under contract by a
national company. (The latter definition has not yet been clarified.) In
addition, the products must have a minimum national value added of
30%,17 however this point has not yet been officially stipulated. Profes-
sional services include consulting of any nature which is regulated by
national law (e.g., law, accounting, engineering, economics, architecture).
Venezuela was the first of the Andean countries to legislate the transforma-
tion of foreign companies in the commercial sector, though now Colombia
and Ecuador are legislating such transformations to a limited degree.
Moreover, Venezuela was one of the first to anticipate the guidelines of
Decision 84 (technology development) in regard to professional services.
In both of these sectors, namely the commercial and professional services
sectors, Decree 62 provides that foreign companies, established as of the
end of l)ecember 1973, must become national enterprises (minimum 80%
Venezuelan) within three years or by May 1977.
By proscribing foreign companies from the commercial sector, the
country is attaching a low degree of importance to commercial tech-
nology (which includes such specialities as logistics, marketing, and
VENEZUELAN TECHNOLOGY POLICIES
services). Although the responsible government officials are willing to
recognize in theory the importance of such technology, in most cases
they are not willing to admit the necessity of paying foreign middlemen
to perform these services. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that a number
of foreign commercial firms have had a substantial impact in terms of
spreading new products important for development and in stimulating
local production. In most cases the foreign commercial houses have been
more dynamic and have outperformed their national counterparts when
there has been direct competition.
Thus far, two major limitations to the prohibition of new DFI in
internal commerce have become evident. The first limitation is in the
area of advanced technology type products (computers in particular)
especially where the world supplier or suppliers constitute a monopoly
or tight oligopoly. In this case, the world suppliers have been consistently
reluctant to diversify ownership. Additionally, it would be extremely
difficult for Venezuela to attempt to effectively provide these services
within the next few years. In the more obvious of these cases the im
portant differences are recognized and exceptions will be made, probably
under the guise of service or technical assistance agreements. However,
in the many other areas where the complexity of the technology is less
apparent or where there are more suppliers, it is likely to be much more
difficult to convince the responsible authorities that exceptions should be
allowed.
The second major limitation to prohibiting foreign activity in internal
commerce is the desire to interest some, if not all, of the foreign suppliers
to begin to manufacture in Venezuela. Unless concessions are made, many
foreign enterprises which currently maintain sales and service subsidiaries
in the country may fade out or sell out completely, and continue exporting
to a national distributor only. Hence, as noted in the previous section,
the Superintendent drafted a proposed decree which would allow foreign
companies presently classified as commercial entities to become manu-
facturing enterprises within a period of years in which case they could
probably remain 100% foreign owned indefinitely (assuming they did not
wish to export to the Andean market). There are two besic conditions
with which such companies would be required to comply. At least 51%
of the products sold in Venezuela would have to be manufactured locally
(though the rest could be imported and possibly some of the first 51%
could be contracted out locally). Second, the products would have to have
a minimum of 30% national value added (which apparently is to be cal-
culated using a rather restricted formula, i.e., after deducting from the
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final value anything which is produced by imported components).
Furthermore, -the Superintendent, in recent public statements, has re-
ferred to the possibility of including a third criterion which would require
that the converting commercial company have a technology contract which
would create a "real transfer" of the technology. However, it is not
believed that this latter condition will be an absolute prerequisite for
conversion if and when this decree is approved.18
The area of professional services remains a highly confused area of
Venezuelan law and policy. The current practice seems to be somewhat
ad hoc, for which reason the SIEX has promised a clarifying decree. The
policy is to utilize Venezuelan professionals wherever possible, in accord-
ance with Decision 84 (Arts. 10 and 12), but the problem has been to de-
cide when foreign consultants are necessary. Given the role of SIEX in the
approval of all technology transactions to and within Venezuela, it appears
that the only legal recourse for foreign consultants who wish to remain
in Venezuela and work in areas governed by national laws is to set up a
national company which is limited to no more than a 20% foreign in-
terest. However, if the foreign consultant intends to work on a specific
and limited duration project, more flexibility has been permitted. The
formation of consortia and the use of dual (often for tax purposes) or
offshore contracts establishing a joint venture are allowed in these cases;
however, Venezuelans must participate. In some cases, particularly in
those involving work for the Government, SIEX has readily approved these
types of contracts, though it is often necessary for the foreign company to
establish domicile through the creation of a local branch.
It is worth noting that Venezuela, as well as its Andean partners and
other countries in Latin America, is becoming more restrictive towards
foreign investment in the finance and tourism sectors. In Venezuela, both
sectors have been governed by separate legislation and both were spe-
cifically excluded from Decrees 62 and 63 (finance and insurance, Decree
62, Art. 4; tourism, Decree 63, Art. 1). The financial sector legislation
was amended in May 1975 and now limits foreign equity participation to
20% for national companies and establishes a series of discriminatory
restrictions for companies with a higher percentage of foreign participa-
tion (Decrees 869 and 870).2 0 In tourism, new proposals of the Andean
Group Junta (Secretariat) would require all tourism entities, including
hotels, to become mixed, national or subregional multinational companies.21
Decree 63, aside from creating SIEX, implemented the rest of De-
cision 24. Chapter VII of Decision 63 refers specifically to the transfer
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of technology and the utilization of patents and trademarks. In gen-
eral, these provisions follow all of those contained in Decision 24, in-
cluding the lists of prohibited clauses in contracts involving patents (Art.
20) and trademarks (Art. 25), as well as the prohibition of royalty pay-
ments between affiliates and the capitalization of technology contributions
(Art. 21). However, this chapter of Decree 63 does go further than
Decision 24 in several respects. One relatively minor provision specifically
excludes occasional individual technical assistance services which do not
exceed a certain amount (not yet defined) per year (Art. 59). On the
other hand, the provision that technology contracts entered into after
April 29, 1974 in no case may exceed a term of jive years of major im.
portance. The Superintendent, under the authority of Decree 746, de-
clared that contracts which antedate the promulgation of Decree 63, and
which now must be "reformed" in accordance with both Decrees 63 and
746, -must be limited to five years.22
In no other Andean Group country have all such contracts arbitrarily
and by law been limited to a set term. 23 The tendency has been to shorten
the duration of such contracts, but at most, general guidelines have been
established, usually by sector and subject to negotiation. In Mexico, a term
of ten years has been fixed as the general rule, but it has been increas-
ingly possible to include automatic renewal clauses which add considerable
flexibility. Indeed, only in Argentina did such restrictive provisions exist
regarding length of contracts and other restrictions of the Decree 746
type. Pressure reportedly is mounting there to relax this attitude.24
Finally, the other provision of Chapter VII of Decree 63 is the re-
quirement that all contracts signed after April 29, 1974, "must contain
the obligation of the supplier to train the required national personnel so
as to obtain the maximum benefit from the contracted technology, and to
promote technological research and development activities in the country."
(Art. 58).25 These provisions are in line with the overall intent of Deci-
sion 84 to stimulate the real transfer of foreign technology and know-how,
and to generate as many local technologically related activities as possible.
This is one of the priority areas in which the Superintendent has indi-
cated a new decree specifying foreign supplier obligations is needed.
Decree 746 of February 1975 is directly related to the provisions of
Decree 63. Decree 746 has two basic purposes. First, it establishes a list
of ten additional prohibited clauses in technology contracts. Second, it
prescribes the periods in which all preexisting technology contracts must
be expunged of offensive provisions. It further prescribes the dates by
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which the terms permitted by SIEX are to have effect on preexisting and
proposed contracts. According to Decision 24 and Decree 63, with its
extended time periods, technology contracts in existence as of January 1,
1974, had to be registered with SIEX by the end of December of that
year. Under Decree 746, as subsequently extended by Decree 1285,26 the
previously registered contracts were to be renegotiated and resubmitted for
registration by June 30, 1976, so as to conform to the provisions of De-
crees 746 and 63, which meant the elimination of the proscribed clauses.
In addition, the Superintendent has said that in the case of the contracts
entered into after January 1, 1974, the maximum duration of five years
will be enforced, presumably from the date of registration. Failure to
conform previously registered contracts might result in the disregard of
their legal effect for any purpose.
Due to the fact that Decree 746 is relatively recent and of national
rather than subregional origin, it is useful to note the additional pro-
hibited clauses (Art. 1). The ten proscriptions for contracts involving
patents, trademarks or other forms of technology are clauses which:
(a) prohibit the manufacture or sale of products made with the
transferred technology once the contract is terminated;
(b) prohibit the use of technical know-how acquired through the
contracted technology once the contract is terminated;
(c) prohibit the use of similar or like commercial trademarks once
the contract is terminated;
(d) impose upon the technology user a determined system of quality
control;
(e) establish an obligation to sell all or part of the resulting pro-
duction to the technology supplier;
(f) establish the obligation to pay royalties for technical assistance
which is not transferred;
(g) require the payment of royalties when the technology has been
acquired outright by the user;
(h) establish the obligation on the part of the user to pay the taxes
which correspond to the supplier;
' (i) oblige the user to give an irrevocable authorization for the sale
of the products:to the supplier; or
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(j) oblige the user to grant a license for the use of the improve-
ments or inventions which result from the process or products
which are the object of the contract.
In all cases, the Superintendent is authorized to evaluate the effects of
any of these types of clauses and to permit exceptions, if they are justi-
fied. Furthermore, the Superintendent may, by presidential decree, pro
scribe other clauses of similar effect.
If the new prohibitions are applied absolutely, then in addition to
the possible negative consequences to the technology importer and to the
country in general, at least two of the prohibitions would contradict cur-
rent national policy or preexisting legislation. The prohibition of most
questionable legal validity is "c" regarding the use of similar or like
trademarks. Venezuela has followed prevailing international norms in the
area of industrial property, though it has never signed the International
Patent Convention. Additionally, the Industrial Property Law of 1955
includes both civil and criminal sanctions for trademark impingement, and
Decision 85 recognizes the sanctity of trademarks. Further, under com-
monly accepted principles of constitutional law, a law approved by the
Congress cannot be modified by a subsequent presidential decree without
express authority; however, that is the justification claimed, in the adop-
tion of proscribed clause "C".2 7
The other item on this list of prohibitions which seems somewhat
incongruous is "d" which proscribes the imposition of a determined
quality control system. Venezuela currently is studying the possibility of
obligating all industries to institute high standard quality control systems.
Furthermore, the Government has emphasized repeatedly the necessity of
developing internationally competitive products, in terms of quality, in
order to be able to export.
In terms of the prerequisites which the Superintendent may take into
account or demand in regard to a proposed technology transfer, it is
necessary to note the additions to Decision 24 contained in Chapter III of
Decision 84. Decision 84 has not yet been implemented in Venezuela,
however the Superintendent has the authority to implement many of its
provisions and, in fact, is already doing so-some were explicitly or
implicitly included in Decree 63. Thus, the SIEX, under Decision 84,
would be directed to take into account in considering a proposed tech-
nology agreement, the following factors, among others (Art. 7):
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(a) effects on technological development, the demand for scientific
and technological services in the subregion, use of local con-
sultants and engineers, possible technological derivations;
(b) effects of the technology on employment;
(c) contribution to specific national or subregional development
plans;
(d) effects on the balance of payments and income generation; and
(e) effects on environment.
In addition, the applicant may be obliged to provide information on alter-
native technologies, sources, conditions of acquisition and justifications
for preferring the suggested technology (Art. 8). Finally, Decision 84
would require that the applicant disaggregate the proposed technology
package to show among others, the characteristics and value of each
component and whether it would have to be obtained abroad or could
be supplied locally.
In point of fact, SIEX is already requiring that much of this in-
formation be provided in the new SIEX form 10 which must be filed
for all technology contracts, including those which had to be reformed
by year end 1975 and all new contracts. Thus far, SIEX is only request-
ing information, though quite detailed, about the technology contract
being applied for, but the Superintendent has stated that he may require
all applicants to suggest three complete alternatives with SIEX. Then, the
Superintendent would indicate which alternative would most likely be
approved. 28
The Foreign Enterprise Transformation Law of August 1976, is the
only law referred to in the preceding section which merits greater elabo-
ration. This Law does not specifically refer to technology transfer, how-
ever, it does seek to regulate the sale of foreign shares to national in-
vestors. This regulation could affect a foreign company's appraisal of its
investment in Venezuela, and consequently, its willingness or interest in
transferring new technology through DFl. Nevertheless, the transforma-
tion law is as much based on the desire of the Government to "democ-
ratize" capital as it is to assure the fulfillment of the quasi-nationalization
goals of the foreign investment policy.
Basically, the Transformation Law gives the Superintendent of For.
eign Investment the mandatory and unrestricted authority to approve all
future proposed sales of foreign shares to national investors as well as to
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review all such prior sales or transfers which occurred after December
31, 1973, the date of entry into force of Decision 24. The Superintendent
also has the legal authority to determine how and to whom a transforming
foreign company must sell, and to investigate to the extent necessary, the
presumed national purchasers. Furthermore, in deciding whether a pro-
posed sale plan is in the "economic, social and technological development
interests of the country," the Superintendent "must" take into account
the following criteria:
(a) the distribution of shares among national shareholders;
(b) the right of the workers of the enterprise to participate in the
transformation process;
(c) the right to participate in the transformation process by re-
lated labor unions; workers associations, cooperatives, savings
and credit unions, and pension and retirement funds; other
types of professional or technical groups or associations; social
service institutions of such associations; and in general any
other entities of a like nature;
(d) the number of new national shareholders who will participate;
(e) the appropriateness of effectuating the sale through public offer,
preferrably by the formation of a SAICA (broadly held public
companies) as defined in the Capital Markets Law; and
(f) the opportunity to sell the shares on the open market.
In addition, the Superintendent may reject any proposed plan without, in
some cases, indicating the reasons for such rejections;29 the only legal re-
course is a court action for abuse of authority (ultra vires). Lastly,
the Superintendent is given full authority to investigate any and all
books or archives of any company covered by Decision 24 and Decrees
62 and 63 as well as to demand "as many verbal or written reports" as
may be deemed necessary on a company's "economic-financial situation
or on any other of its operations." (Art. 6). It is this provision which
has led many lawyers to believe that SIEX now has the authority to in-
vestigate the records of any company in the country, regardless of the
company's classification as 100% national to 100% foreign, whether it is
in a process of transformation or not, and whether it has any foreign
contact whatsoever of the kind covered by Decision 24.
The Transformation Law has been questioned on several constitu-
tional grounds. Among these are the constitutional prohibition against
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retroactive legislation, the fact that Decision 24 established certain rights
for the foreign investor which are herein compromised, and the excessive
authority given to a public official who is not required to announce his
decisions. The Law has been criticized for its failure to refer to a me-
chanism for establishing a fair price for foreign held shares, an alterna-
tive procedure if the stock cannot be sold, or as a means of avoiding ex-
cessive potential direct intervention by the State.
The present intentions of the Government do not appear to justify
these worst-case fears. This was partially reconfirmed by SIEX on Decem.
her 1, 1975, when it restated the prior non-intervention policy in the
case of companies which are currently national or mixed, that is, foreign
shareholders in these types of firms may sell their shares to national in-
vestors without the prior approval of SIEX. This law resulted from a
minor public outrage at the purchase of a majority interest in Sears, a
well-known retail chain by one of the relatively few large monied groups
in the country in spite of the desires of one of the principal national labor
unions to buy at least a portion of that company. Until this law, neither
the Superintendent nor any other juridical entity had any authority over
this kind of transaction. However, Government has continually stated its
goal of enacting policies which will tend toward wealth and income
distribution. At the same time, no responsible authorities in the Govern.
ment have suggested that the goal is to turn over a very high percentage
of private property in general to the workers or any labor associations.
(There are exceptions however, particularly in the agroindustrial sector
through cooperatives, which is the solution proposed for the to-be-
nationalized powdered milk and animal feed industries.) Nevertheless, a
bias in favor of seeing that the workers in a particular industry have a
significant direct interest in their enterprise is known to exist. No figures
have been mentioned, but the well-known Sears experience has often been
referred to in informal conversation. Regardless of how desirable this
sort of policy might be, the real fear, of course, is that policy instruments
which attempt to be too ambitious could fall into hands which do not
recognize the same constitutional or fundamental rights restraints.
Venez uelan Policy on Technology Transfer and Development
Before completing this review of current Venezuelan legislation on
technology transfer and DFI, it is useful to summarize briefly the ex-
pressed policy in this area and to make a few observations regarding its
implementation.
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Present policy is grounded on two basic principles: acquisition,
domination and creation of scientific-technological knowledge; and tech-
nological-economic independence. The first is related to technological
education and the development of a certain degree of technological
capability which is essential for the adaption and utilization of the ap-
propriate technologies for the harmonious socioeconomic development of
the country. The second refers to the objective of limiting the degree of
dependencia by attempting to force greater "real" technology transfer,
diversifying alternative technology sources and avoiding as much as pos-
sible the payment of technology based monopoly rents. Of course, by
limiting the discussion to industrial technology, it is apparent that most
of such technology is generated by the productive entities of the world,
and that the usual channels for transfer are commercial links. Conse-
quently., the practical distinctions between these two national policy ob-
jectives are greatly reduced.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in pursuit of the first objective,
gaining scientific and technological capability, Venezuela is expanding
great energies and sums to educate a new generation of young technolo-
gists and technocrats, and to fortify the country's relatively recently
created and still fledgling research efforts. Rather massive use is being
made of distinguished foreign consultants of all kinds. In areas where a
shortage of local technicians exists, qualified immigrants have been
sought who can help fill the widely recognized and reported human
resources void which, in part, has become suddenly more critical as a
result of the newly increased petroleum wealth. As might be *epected,
though, not all of these efforts have been as well planned, administered
or received as possible. 30
The second objective, greater technological independence and the
cessation of excessive technology monopoly rents payments, is more ger-
mane to this discussion as it directly affects the terms and conditions
under which industrial technology can be brought into the country, as
well as the preferred sources of supply. In this area, current nationalistic
sentiments against foreign investment and international economic politics
are even more apparent.
In brief, the general policy dictates are to pay as little as possible
for technology, either in terms of outright purchase, licensing or foreign
equity ownership, and usually to obtain the best technology available.
Hence, the Government, through SIEX, is acting as watchdog and ne-
gotiator and is scrutinizing with great care purchase or licensing agree-
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ments. When the terms of such agreements appear to SIEX to be unjust
for the country, counterproposals are being made. In the case of foreign
equity investments, the Government is playing a similar part by re-
ducing the foreign share to the lowest acceptable percentage at the outset
and attempting to assure maximum technological benefits for the country.
In terms of technology sources, the overall policy is to diversify
technology ties away from the United States, which is seen as all the
more urgent with the exclusion of Venezuela and its other OPEC partners
from the U.S. trade scheme of generalized preferences for the developing
countries. This includes looking more towards Europe and Japan, as well
as toward the Socialist countries (although to a minor degree thus far)
for alternative technology suppliers. The overall policy also includes
actual implementing the often voiced policy of creating greater economic
independence in order to achieve political independence among the
countries of Latin America, and now of OPEC and others of the Third
World. Thus, Venezuela has turned to Mexico in search of petrochemical,
steel and automotive technologies, to Brazil for advice in shipbuilding and
steel, and to Argentina as a possible source of technology in the agroin-
dustrial and machine tools-metals products sectors. This overall policy is
in line with Venezuela's new foreign policy thrust in defense of the Latin
American Economic System (SELA), OPEC and other OPEC-type cartels.
The overall policy is also in line, in general, with Venezuela's policy of a
less dependent course in development.
Tying these two objectives together is the fairly novel idea currently
under consideration to create a Technology Bank. The proposed purpose of
the Bank would be to finance, acquire and channel all forms of applied
technology. The Bank would be able to finance the development of, and
search for, new technologies by the productive sector, or the Bank could
enter directly into the technology negotiation process seeking out needed
technologies on its own for purchase or license in order to grant sub-
leases to industrial users. Thus, depending on the degree of coordination
with SIEX, the Bank could, if established, overlap and conflict with some
of SIEX's current authority.
Venezuela's leaders are convinced that pouring more money and
effort into the development of human, scientific and technological re-
sources will result in progress toward developing such resources. They
are convinced that forcing foreign suppliers into joint venture positions
will result -in progress toward the assimilation of technological knowledge
and skills by the country's public and private sector entrepeneurs. Con-
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sequently, more rapid progress will be achieved in terms of real socio-
economic development in the broadest sense. This is in keeping with the
President's pledge to strive for Latin American economic cooperation and
integration before the developing countries of Latin America and the
world are forced to allow the transnational enterprises to bring about the
integration of their economies for them. 3' Thus, the policy also includes
urging the rest of Latin America, possibly through SELA, to adopt a
similar stance toward technology transfer and DFI. The Superintendent
of Foreign Investment has stated on various occasions that had the coun.
try adopted its current technology policies ten years earlier, Venezuelans
today would be generating and innovating much of their own technology,
and national entrepreneurs would not need to be assisted by the Govern-
ment to avoid paying too much and getting too little under the terms
of any given technology contract. This, of course, may be too ambitious
and some of the current policies, or their application, may later be seen
as a mistake. However, there is no doubt that for the present, Venezuela
has, and knows it has, the one resource best designed to help it achieve
these objectives - money. As long as things continue to go smoothly,
and prosperously, the country is likely to maintain another of the im-
portant ingredients which will keep technology suppliers interested into
the foreseeable future: namely, a democratic, stable and primarily market
oriented society) 2
RECENT EVENTS REGARDING THE POSSIBLE
MODIFICATION OF DECISION 2433
The recent discussions concerning a possible set of regulations, a
euphemisim for modifications, for Decision 24 are directly related to
Venezuelan technology and foreign investment policies. Hence, a short
digression of the discussions, which started in early 1975 and were held
at the subregional level of -the Andean group, is deemed appropriate.
Without going into the history of the attempts to reexamine Decision
24 in the Andean Group, it is sufficient to note that in the latter half of
1975, the Commission called for the formation of a Consultative Commit-
tee made up of high level experts from the six countries. The Junta pre-
pared a draft set of regulations for discussion, and the Committee held its
first meeting in mid-Novemnber of that year. Thereafter, at the special
insistance of Chile, agreement was reached in principle to push forward
with the modification.
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With a few exceptions, the Junta's draft closely. follows the principles
of Decision 24, as indeed was to be expected. In general, it attempts to
define in more precise terms some of the nebulous concepts of Decision
24 and to close some of the loopholes contained therein. For example, the
draft would expand the present definition of DFI to include used as well
as new equipment or machinery, raw materials, intermediate and final
products, and all parts and replacements. The definition of DF would
also include all monies in local currency: specifically, amortization and
interest payments, proceeds from the sale of shares plus any capital gains,
and royalty or other payments for technology. Foreign branches would
be accepted for the first time, although they would still be treated like
subsidiaries. The one year uninterrupted residence requirement for
foreign individuals would be dropped in favor of a simple declaration not
to repatriate capital or remit profits. The reinvestment limitation of an
automatic 5% of the registered capital base would be maintained; how-
ever, the potential problem of "limbo" money, (earnings over the present
19% which could be remitted and reinvested) would be eliminated. The
foreign investor who did not receive authorization for greater amounts of
reinvestments would be forced-to distribute such sums. Yet, there is no
explanation of what will occur if this amount exceeds the profit remittance
ceiling, but it is assumed that the ceiling will be raised or eliminated.
Foreign companies would still be entitled only to short-term internal
credit, but an amount equivalent to one and a half times repatriable
capital would be allowed. Furthermore, some flexibility would be possible
to raise or lower this amount according to the sector. One interesting pro-
vision would prohibit the authorization of new DFI in foreign companies,
established after July 1, 1971, which have not agreed to transform. De-
cision 24 obviated this possibility by requiring all foreign firms estab-
lished after this date to enter into transformation agreements as a condi-
tion of entry, (Art. 30), although this could be intended to refer only to
expansion. The only possible exception could be in the area covered by
Chapter IlI (service and basic sectors). In that area, the countries have
been freely able to choose to apply their own national legislation. Article
20 of Decision 24, which contains the prohibited clauses in patent licensing
agreements, was reiterated in full, but Article 25 on trademark agree-
ments was not. Finally, regarding the important question of the profit
remittance ceiling, the Junta made no specific suggestion and left this
area open for discussion by the member countries.
Turning to the Consultative Committee's reception and interpretation
of these proposals, there was relatively little consensus among the coun-
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tries. This does not mean, however, that the base of support for a com-
mon code has erroded, with the exception of Chile. Rather, only a low
degree of dissension continues to divide the countries on specific points.
Nonetheles, it was evident that a majority of countries is leaning toward
a greater flexibility regarding DFJ.
The majority suggested that mixed enterprises which invest in other
mixed enterprises should be considered national investors, as long as
national investors continued to predominate. More flexibility could be
allowed when a foreign investor increased its percentage in a mixed en-
terprise provided it did not cease to be a mixed enterprise by virtue of
the new investments. No solution was found to Chile's request that, due to
its particular economic situation, it be allowed to sell firms which are
presently national to foreign investors, although it did receive support for
its position. This legal condition has ceased to exist with the Commission's
April 1976 approval of such sale in the Chilean case. 4
There was a diversity of opinion on the important transformation
principle. Some countries suggested that certain types of investments be
excluded from the transformation requirement or that the periods for
transformation be extended. Others felt that the existing sanctions for
noncompliance, that is, not being able to take advantage of the trade
liberation program, should be strengthened. In addition, no agreement
was reached regarding raising the profit remittance ceiling, though the
tendency is clearly to choose a higher level or to eliminate the ceiling al-
together. One country suggested that this decision be left open for each
government to decide. Finally, both of the relatively less developed coun-
tries suggested that they be allowed greater flexibility on a number of
points in order to provide more attractive conditions for DFI.
The specific question of technology transfer, out of the DFI con-
text, was not discussed. However, this fact should not be taken as an in-
dication that a general consensus exists in this area; rather, the meeting
was only the beginning of a continuing process.
THE SUPERINTENDENCY Or FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND
THE APPLICATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY RULES
As noted previously, Decree 63 of April 29, 1974 created the
Superintendency for Foreign Investment (SIEX), an agency of the
Ministry of Development. SIEX was designated the national authority
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for all matters relating to the application of Decision 24. The only change
in the authority of SIEX, as yet, is due to Decree 1225 of October 1975.
As a result of that decree, the regulation of foreign companies and in-
vestments in the hydrocarbons or affiliated sectors is no longer handled
by SIEX. It is now to be handled, for all purposes, by a special office
in the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons. As of November 1976, this
office was only formally organized. Consequently, it is not yet clear how
broad the mandate for this office will be nor whether there will be any
difference in its approach from that of SIEX." 5
Legally, SIEX is only an administrative agency and does not have
the explicit independent authority to approve new investments, foreign
company transformations or technology contracts. These investments,
transformations, and contracts must be approved by the Advisory Com-
mittee created by Decree 63. The Committee is to be chaired by the
Superintendent of Foreign Investment and is to include as members high
level officials from the Central Bank, the Institute of Foreign Trade, and
the Ministries of the Treasury and Development and Planning. This Com-
mittee is to meet regularly once a month or whenever convoked by the
Minister of Development or the Superintendent. In practice, however, the
Committee's meetings have been sporadic and more authority has devolved
upon SIEX.3 6 Supposedly, it is this Committee which is to set overall
policy for foreign investment in the country.
SIEX began to function in July 1975 under the direction of the
Superintendent and an Assistant Superintendent. It is endowed with a
relatively small staff of approximately forty professionals, including
various outside advisors. This has proven to be an inadequate number to
deal with the nearly 4,000 foreign investment registrations and some 8,000
individual applications. The staff is relatively inexperienced in dealing
with foreign investment evaluation. Furthermore, SIEX has been subject
to certain budgetary limitations which have further hampered its ability
to increase personnel and to carry out all of its various responsibilities.
As a consequence, the several deadlines for registration and particularly
for reforming all existing technology contracts have been continually
pushed back.
Another important factor affecting the operational ability of SIEX
during its first year was the degree of bureaucratic jealousy and infigh't-
ing with at least two other governmental agencies which attempted to ap-
propriate some of SIEX's responsibilities. 37 The general consensus, in
spite of all these obstacles, is that SIEX has functioned relatively well
VENEZUELAN TECHNOLOGY POLICIES
and that the personnel have attempted to be cooperative, and at the same
time, remain faithful to a strict application of the national legislation
and policies.
Among the major problem areas which have arisen, there are two
in particular which are directly related to the foregoing factors. First,
both foreign and national investors, who depend on foreign technology
contracts or foreign equity contributions, have been frustrated by the
bureaucratic delays in the approval of new projects, which average four
to six months. Under current world and Venezuelan inflationary condi-
tions, this delay adds a minimum of five to ten percent to the cost of a
project. The delay is due to the shortage of trained personnel and con-
tinuing institutional and legal uncertainties. Second, as a new agency
dealing with a new policy area for Venezuela and as an agency which is
under jealous scrutiny by other government agencies, SIEX has tended
to move cautiously - both slowly and by following a strict interpreta-
tion of the rules. Ironically, a high level official of the previous adminis-
tration involved in the discussions at that time and now an important
figure in the private sector, recently was heard lamenting the costly
bureaucratic delays and the strict interpretations which were frustrating
projects he felt were in the interest of the country.
Perhaps the sources of greatest frustration, are the continued eco-
nomic planning and legal uncertainties, both of which are endemic to
societies newly attempting to implement major, massive socio-economic
development plans.38 The specific role foreign investment should play in
the development plans or even the priorities sectors for such investment
is not clear. This makes the job of applying a broad foreign investment
policy far more difficult, especially in regard to the multitude of minute
financial, legal and other problems which are the essence of modern busi-
ness operations. In part, due to this overall imprecision, and in part due
to the lack of adequate experience, SIEX has found it difficult to decide
upon specific interpretations for the many unforseen (or unknown) daily
business situations and problems which arise. Complicating this matter
even further are the current subregional discussions on the regulations to
Decision 24. In this kind of environment, many potential foreign in-
vestors or technology suppliers have been tempted to sit back and await
a clarification of the rules. To its credit, SIEX is aware of these problems.
However, combined with a lack of independence at the national and sub-
regional levels, a mere awareness has not been sufficient.
With respect to the specific application of the technology rules in
Venezuela, there is still a great deal which is undefined. This is due in
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large part, as noted, to the relatively brief experience to date. Decision 24
required the registration of all technology contracts within six months of
the Decision's entry into force, which would have meant by July 1974.
However, SIEX did not even begin to function until a few days prior to
the statutory deadline. Since there were no defined procedures or regis-
tration forms at that time, the registration date was at first extended to the
end of October 1974 (six months after the effective date of Decree 63), and
then again extended to the end of 1974. With the promulgation of Decree
746 in February 1975, all of the previously registered, but thus far un-
changed, technology contracts were required to be fully reformed by the
end of December 1975. That entailed the deletion of all the offensive
clauses as listed in Decision 24, and Decrees 63 and 746. The December
1975 deadline was extended to June 30, 1976, and nay be extended again
due to the lack of clarity, amount of detail and number of contracts in-
volved. In many cases, the reformation requirement has meant the con-
tracts have had to be completely renegotiated.
Originally for the purposes of registration, SIEX prepared a fairly
lengthy and detailed form (SIEX-06) which elicited substantial informa-
tion regarding the technology involved and which also required a series of
other legal documents. In September of 1975, SIEX decided that even more
detailed information on the legal, economic and technical aspects of the
technology was needed. It issued the new and current form, SIEX-10,
which requires that all preexisting, reformed and new technology contracts
be submitted for appraisal on the basis of -the new form. These contracts
must be resubmitted for appraisal notwithstanding their previous reforma-
tion and resubmission under form SIEX-06. It was reported that the
SIEX-10 form requirement was the principle reason for the December
extension.
Since the enactment of Decree 746, registration and approval of tech-
nology contracts are now two distinct steps. Preexisting contracts were
originally only required to be registered; the approval step was implied.
Thus, a technology user could continue to pay royalties and abide by the
other provisions of the contract, except as for contracts between affiliates
which were proscribed by Decision 24. Following the mandate to reform
these preexisting contracts, it became evident that SIEX intends to ques.
tion the economic and technical aspects of these agreements as well, which
are now to be limited to a maximum period of five years. SIEX has ap-
parently considered these reformed contracts sufficiently new to allow
SIEX to make an evaluation of their economic and technical terms, though
Decree 746 refers only to the legal terms contained therein. Hence, even
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with preexisting technology agreements, reregistration of the reformed
documents does not necessarily assure continued approval, and it cer-
tainly will not assure approval in the case of new technology agreements.
All such contracts are to be thoroughly evaluated in terms of the legal
obligations established, their economic cost and value, and the importance
of the technology involved. For the latter two categories, STEX is being
assisted by economic specialists from the Ministry of Development and
other agencies, and by technologists from the National Scientific and
Technological Research Council (CONICIT). In these cases, there is no
doubt that SIEX can and is intervening to question the appropriateness of
the terms of payment or the technology.
A review of the types of information required in the new form
SIEX-1O may provide an indication of the means through which Vene-
zuela is attempting to implement its technology policies as well as an
indication of several of the problem areas foreign technology suppliers
can expect to face in the future. First, the form requires detailed infor-
mation in three areas: legal, economic and technical. (Legal refers to
information about the parties and the contracts.) It has been this mass
of required information which has forced the Government to extend the
deadlines and which has caused the long delays in the approval of tech-
nology contracts. A high level SIEX official admitted in a public meeting
the tremendous difficulties SIEX faces in making the economic and tech-
nical evaluations. The legal information, he noted, was easy to evaluate
since that required only a quick review to guarantee that none of the
prohibited clauses were included in the contract, whereas the economic
and technical evaluations required clear national guidelines and highly
specialized personnel, implying that neither are deemed adequate to meet
the task.
SIEX Form 10 must be completed by the licensee or user of the
technology. However, this often cannot be done without the full cooperation
of the supplier. For this reason, the user must first apply to SIEX for its
classification as a national, mixed or foreign company, thus subjecting
even 100% Venezuelan companies to the scrutiny of SIEX. Detailed in-
formation concerning the Andean Group treatment of the final product
is also elicited, i.e., whether the product is reserved for sectoral program-
ming and, if so, whether an assignment has yet been made. Further, in-
formation is required regarding the other countries in which the technology
is registered and contracted for. SIEX has suggested that it will be able
to check with this information with the other countries regarding the use
of the technology and the terms of the licensee.
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The form requires detailed information on the disaggregated tech-
nology both by type and value as a percentage of the overall cost of
the royalty being asked. This is in line with the Andean Group philosophy
and has several purposes. Presumably, it will allow SIEX to determine
which components can be supplied locally, thereby reducing the overall
cost of the technology and, therefore, the royalty payment. And it will
assist the country in determining whether it should place more effort on
training local technicians or developing new peripheral or even modular
technologies.
The licensee is required to state whether the technology might be
acquired outright, possibly by the proposed Technology Bank for sub-
license back to the user, or renegotiated either by the user or possibly
with the help of SIEX or another agency of the Government. Both of these
are important features of the overall policy and are indicative of the role
SIEX sees for itself and other official entities. Finally, the legal informa-
tion required for preexisting technology contracts includes detailed in-
formation regarding past royalty or other payments.
The economic information which must be supplied includes a number
of factors important to the country, such as labor, national value added,
expected production and anticipated export. The required information in-
eludes machinery replacement which might possibly burden Government
sources of finance. The licensee is also required to list the principal com-
petitors, in part to help SIEX determine if the sector is adequately served,
especially by national producers. Complete price and distribution infor-
mation is elicited, supposedly not for the purpose of price controls, but
rather to help determine the cost of technology at each price level and
to determine whether any of the intermediate stages between production
and the final consumer might be eliminated. However, the applicant must
provide complete income and profit information. Data is required regard-
ing borrowing and other credit operations.
Lastly, under technical information, the form requires a description
of alternative technologies available and a justification for the particular
technology chosen. (The Superintendent has not yet attempted to im-
plement his idea requiring that each applicant present at least three alter-
natives for review by SIEX.) Information is required on the type and
terms of any equipment or machinery involved, including cost and de-
preciation. The Superintendent has suggested that if local entrepreneurs
are not able to acquire such equipment on favorable terms, SIEX might
step in to buy or renegotiate that which is needed. Data must be pro-
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vided on the sources of any raw materials or intermediate goods. Despite
the prohibition in Decree 746 against a determined cystem of quality
control, information is required on the type of quality control system used
by the license. In this regard, the Superintendent has stated that all
products made with foreign technology will have to meet the standards
to be exacted by the Venezuelan quality control authorities (COVENIN).
Full information must be supplied on any research and development ac-
tivities on the part of the applicant.
Thus far, there has been little experience upon which to judge the
actual implementation of the many rules and criteria. This is, of course,
due to the recent promulgation of the rules and requirements. However,
there are several general principles which should guide potential tech-
nology suppliers. If the technology is to serve one of the high priority
areas, such as petrochemicals, automotive parts, intermediate industrial
goods of all kinds, or is a technology contract which fulfills any of the
other national development goals, such as increasing non-traditional ex-
ports, augmenting employment, developing the undeveloped zones of the
country, or strengthening the industrial infrastructure, the technology is
likely to be viewed favorably. The "real" transfer of technology and know-
how to the country, which include the willingness of the supplier to be
generous in terms of the technology offered as well as in terms of training
programs of all kinds and the employment of Venezuelans in high man-
agerial and technical positions are also of key importance. Naturally, the
Government is interested in paying as little as possible for its purchases.
However, experience indicates that SIEX will allow a fairly reasonable
price if it can be justified. Apparently, the general attitude has been that
the money is available and the country will be better served by seeking
the best, if the best can be obtained under conditions acceptable to the
Government. Although there are a few exceptions, this has been the over-
all strategy in the key sectors currently being developed.
The Superintendent has voiced his views on several occasions regard-
ing a few important criteria for royalty payments. However, it has not
yet been established how these will be carried over into practice. Foreign
technology suppliers are required to disaggregate their technology pack-
age and to itemize the cost for each component. These royalties, it is felt,
should be calculated as a percentage of net sales, but with a fixed limit
so that such payments do not exceed a defined percentage of net profits
before tax. However, it is understood that SIEX has already approved
several technology contracts providing for a set fee per unit produced. In
the same regard, the Superintendent has suggested that royalties fixed on
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a declining basis will be preferred, i.e., the royalty percentage would
decline as the number of units produced or the volume of sales increased.
The termination of royalty payments prior to the end of the five year
period after a certain amount has been paid or a specified number of
units produced would also be preferred.
In general, SIEX believes that the higher the percentage of the
Venezuelan market, or the higher the profit return, attributable to the
foreign technology, the greater the inducement to stay in the Venezuelan
market. Therefore, the technology user will be in a stronger position to
bargain for a lower royalty. On the other hand, the Superintendent has
also expressed the view that if the technology user were to make a rela-
tively low profit, then the royalty fee paid should be proportionately low-
ered. Finally, on a positive note, the Superintendent stated that the idea of
paying a higher royalty on the portion of production which is exported,
as an inducement to exports, is being contemplated. To date, and this
should continue at least until the preexisting contract has been modified or
rejected, SIEX has allowed technology users to continue to pay royalties,
except between affiliates, even though the respective contracts have neither
been registered nor approved. However, there is a restitution and fine
provision for illegal payments.
One slight deviation from the general Decision 24 rules which has
been mentioned is the possibility of approving a "grant-back" clause re-
quiring the user to convey to the supplier improvements or innovations
discovered by the user, but only if the supplier agrees to provide an
equivalent additional technology to the licensee. The supplier presumably
could try to include such a clause promising the payment of an adequate
compensation.
On the matter of preexisting contracts, SIEX has announced that the
contracts will be limited to a five year period, but there remains some
confusion as to the date when this period commences. The Superintendent
has said the period should commence from the date the contract was signed,
or at the latest from the date of entry into effect of Decision 24 (Jan-
uary 1, 1974). On the other hand, if the contract is required to be com-
pletely reformed, the question arises as to whether it is a new contract.
On this point it has been suggested that each case must be decided on
its merits, but the general feeling is that all resubmitted contracts should
contain a new date.39 Presumably, then, the five year period would com-
mence as of the date of approval; before that time the contract would
have no legal effect even though royalty payments would be permitted.
40
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In regard to the five year rule, thus far no exceptions are known to
have been granted. SIEX has offered as one possibility the inclusion of
a renewal clause, but subject to full review by SIEX at the end of five
years, which is not a guarantee of renewal. Another idea suggested was
that a technology supplier who wanted a term longer than five years
might at the outset write multiple contracts to commence when the tech-
nology covered was to be used. However, thus far the Superintendent has
said he can approve only present contracts and that contracts to be signed
in the future would have no validity.
In further exercise of the State's power, SIEX has announced that it
will consult with its Andean partners as well as other countries, includ-
ing Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, to discern which particular technology
suppliers have been unwilling to comply with the national policies.41
SIEX has acknowledged that if it forces national technology users to re-
negotiate their contracts or if SIEX is more exacting, this could cause
some hardship should the suppliers not wish to renegotiate under the terms
demanded by the country. In these cases, SIEX or possibly the Technology
Bank could step in either to negotiate with the previous supplier or to
assist the local entrepreneur in locating an alternative technology source
or product source in the case of trademarks.
Finally, one matter which has been mentioned but which deserves
further attention, although there appear to be no cases on the subject,
is the existence of the various possibilities for transformation of foreign
enterprises. It was noted earlier in regard to the Transformation Law that
several substantive issues are not included therein, such as reference to
a formula or measure for calculating the value of foreign shares or a
possible mechanism which could be used should the shares not appear at-
tractive to the market. With respect to the formula, it appears to be the
presumption that a market value will exist or that a reasonable agreement
can be reached. There have been exceptions; for example, the situation
could be quite different for a relatively small foreign company which has
comparatively more of its assets tied up in a Venezuelan subsidiary than
for one of the petroleum giants. 4Z
Where the foreign shareholder could not find a market for his stock
at a just price from the point of view of the foreign company, and pre-
sumably of the country, or even if a preferred market were found, several
possibilities have been mentioned as remedies. In the event there were no
ready buyers, one proposal is that the Government, through the Vene-
zuelan Investment Fund or other agencies, acquire the shares outright,
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with the intention of later selling them to as wide a public market as
possible. According to another proposal, the Government, through SIEX
or some other entity, would acquire the stock in trust for the shareholders.
The Government would have the right to vote the stock but would allow
the shareholder to receive the dividends until a reasonable scheme for the
stock's sale could be arranged.
4
Another idea, which would be more appropriate for smaller com-
panies would be for the foreign company to sell a certain percentage of
shares to the workers individually or to the local union. However, the
foreign company would maintain a first option to repurchase when the
worker leaves the company in order to resell to the next worker or to
others already employed. The goal would be to maintain a permanent
stimulus and allegiance on the part of the workers. If this idea were to
be accepted, as it might, it would be necessary to guarantee that the
worker acquire full legal control and independence in the exercise of the
rights incident to ownership of the stock. The option formula would have
to be carefully worded so as not to violate the principle that national
shares normally cannot pass back to foreign ownerhip. In theory, this
idea would appear to appeal to SIEX. It accords with the new Trans-
formation Law. Further, the notion of giving the employees of any com-
pany a significant, but reasonable (10-20%) share is popular. As sug-
gested earlier, however, there is no thought at the moment, being given
to anything approaching the Peruvian scheme whereby the workers of
any private company were to acquire 50% ownership.44 SIEX officials
have, at least in this regard, expressed a sense of awareness and concern
about the possible disruptive effects which a policy of this kind could
have. Nevertheless, it is too early to predict the particular method of
transformation which will be adopted. With the broad discretion given
to the Government by the Transformation Law, this is an area ripe for
pressures from many sides.
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
FOREIGN INVESTOR OR TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIER
If all the data were available on foreign investment and technology
flows occurring since Decision 24 went into effect in the Andean sub-
region, it, nevertheless, would be impossible to make a thorough evalua.
tion of :the Decision's impact. Neither the evils of DFI nor the supposed
benefits of greater control are readily quantifiable. In addition, the broad
Decision 24 policy toward DFI is only one of the factors taken into ac.
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count by foreign investors or technology suppliers, and in some of the
Andean countries the great shifts in the politico-economic conditions have
weighed much more heavily. With the exception of Ecuador, none of the
Andean countries has received greater direct foreign capital or technology
inflows after 1970 than previously in the manufacturing and agroindus-
trial sectors. In fact, several countries received reduced amounts. (The
manufacturing and agroindustrial sectors are practically the only sectors
governed by Decision 24 due to the permitted application of national laws
in the mining, finance, service and other sectors.)
In the case of Ecuador, aside from the tardy implementation of De-
cision 24 in practical terms and the added inducement of a free exchange
system with few controls, much of the increase in foreign capital was due
to the petroleum boom of the early 1970's and came from other Latin
American countries from which there has been substantial capital flight in
recent years. Other countries, such as Colombia, have continued to report
normal or increased amounts of new capital investment, apparently prov-
ing that Decision 24 has not frightened away foreign capital, and that
foreign investors are learning to live with the new rules. However, upon
close inspection it may be observed that in the vast majority of cases these
investments are either special arrangements with the host governments
(as in the minerals and other sectors) or are actually loans. The invest-
ments may also be the cause of the expansion of existing DFI to meet the
increasing demand of growing economies or may be used to fill voids
created in many instances by deliberate import substitution policies. Rela-
tively few of these supposed investments are actually new investments in
the nonpublic sector. Another important factor which must be taken into
account, and which is extremely difficult to measure, is the number of
these new investments which may be only expressions of a future, but not
a present intent to invest. For example, under the pressures of the import
substitution policies and in some cases of Andean Group programming, it
has appeared advisable to register new investment projects so as to fore-
close the possibility that a competitor might take advantage by making
the actual investment at a later date depending upon conditions at that
time.
In the case of Venezuela, the figures for 1975 show a rather meager
$52 million in new registered investment of which $11 million were rein-
vestments in existing enterprises. This amount is even less than that
reported in Colombia in 1974. These figures compare to a registered base
of roughly $1.2 billion, though the official report states that this is not an
accurate reflection of the total DFI in Venezuela (almost an equal amount
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was refused or is still pending registration, and all of these figures ex-
clude the petroleum, mining and tourism sectors). Reportedly, 116 new
technology contracts were submitted for approval, but only 15 were ap-
proved during 1975. 4 '
The lack of increase in inflows after 1970 was in part the expressed
intent of the Decision 24 planners. There was an implicit assumption that
enough DFI had already been absorbed, and an explicit determination
that only DFI through joint ventures should be accepted. It is interesting
to observe, however, that the country experts and responsible officials
appeared to express doubt as to the wisdom of this view at their meeting
in November of 1975 to discuss a set of regulations for Decision 24.
It has already been speculated why matters have moved so slowly
in Venezuela. Undoubtedly it is due, in part, to the limited number of
personnel in SIEX and to the bureaucratic and political difficulties of
initiating activities in a new policy area. However, there are a number
of other factors which must be considered in order to understand the
functions of SIEX and the strategies being adopted by foreign investors
and technology suppliers.
First, it must be realized that in regard to new DFI or technology
contract applications, SIEX plays a direct role in the negotiations. In
effect, SIEX becomes either the national representative in the case of a
new DFI venture in which there is no local partner, which is becoming
extremely rare, or in the alternative, a third party between the national and
foreign partners. In the case of new proposals, it is no longer possible to
simply register a project. It is equally impossible to avoid negotiating
with SIEX on the project, though the negotiation may take different
forms. SIEX has often hinted that it would prefer informal consultation
with the prospective investor or supplier. However, if the investor or sup-
plier chooses to avoid the informal route, the result would be the same
with the formal document presentation. SIEX takes the position that the
documents represent a mere proposal to be examined and questioned.
Local lawyers, economists, auditors and consultants who bear the brunt of
the work between prospective investors and SIEX are divided in their
opinions as to whether it is wise to anticipate too much of the probable
negotiation with SIEX through preliminary informal discussion. Of course,
the specific strategy adopted on behalf of the client may depend upon the
type of investment or technology involved since the ratio between the
desire of the Government to obtain a particular technology and its avail-
ability in the world is always a decisive factor.
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The willingness of the foreign investor or technology owner to accept
the new rules has varied. Several major projects of great importance to
the country have been stymied thus far due to the unwillingness or in-
ability of either side to make concessions on the critical issue of technology.
The Government has stood fast on its five year rule. At the same time,
it has offered lowered compensation or continued confidentiality, both of
which are unacceptable to the foreign companies. Partially as a result of
this experience, potential investors have preferred to keep a careful watch
on the situation, rather than to informally approach the Government,
until the policies the Government decides on are clear. This kind of
strategy may include the occasionally long and arduous task of looking
or waiting for the right kind of local partner. This method will probably
be the prevalent form of DFI in the future, although its incidence cannot
yet be determined. It may depend, in part, on whether commercial com-
panies are allowed and choose to convert into manufacturing operations.
However, having found a local partner may provide little guarantee
that all will go smoothly, for at least two reasons. First, although the for-
eign and local investors or the foreign technology suppliers may have
worked out an arrangement to the satisfaction of both, SIEX may object
for whatever reason and suggest that if the project is to be registered cer-
tain changes will have to be made. This initiative could come independ-
ently of SIEX or it could originate from the local partner who suggests it
to SIEX or a higher level within the Government. As another possibility,
the local partner, initially acting in good faith, may suddenly decide that,
justified or riot, he may get a better deal by tacitly or expressly siding
with SIEX. This is in part just the role SIEX seeks to perform. In all
cases SIEX will attempt to reduce the costs, from the point of view of
the country, to a minimum. In many ways, this situation is a relatively
standard bargaining situation in joint venture operations. However, in
many countries of Latin America, the foreign investor will find that a
third party has been added to the equation in the form of the Govern-
ment and that often the game will be played two against one. If the po-
tential investor or technology supplier is in a monopoly or tight oligopoly
position, his bargaining strength may be reduced only slightly. In most
cases, the outcome will depend on the uniqueness of the technology, or
the case will involve limited technology suppliers who are willing to make
special concessions. However, if the potential investor or technology sup-
plier is not in such a situation, the competition among the interested
parties may become analogous to bidding on an attractive public works
project. This type of competition may not be so bad considering the many
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sizeable engineering and consulting firms abroad; on the other hand, the
firms risk limited quantities of capital and monopoly technology with
each participation. 46
The second reason why a local partner may provide little guarantee
is the attitude which SIEX has thus far appeared to adopt regarding what
it intends to negotiate or rather, the nature of its function. For example,
in one instance an important company prepared what it thought to be a
generous offer to Venezuela which included the supply of a new and val-
uable technology for which it offered to accept no royalties or other pay.
ments. The company would initiate the venture as a broader joint venture
than legally required and sell down to a mixed company position at a fairly
modest preset price in less time than required by Decision 24. SIEX
turned down the proposal and suggested that a shorter transformation
period would be more appropriate. (Transformation periods not exceeding
15 years are listed in Decree 63 as one of the criteria which SIEX takes
into account in approving foreign investment - Art. 27.) The company
then agreed that it could sell down in the shorter period suggested, but
it would have to increase the sale price of its ownership to compensate
for the loss in anticipated earnings. This was rejected as well on the
grounds that although the Government could suggest modifications in the
proposal, once the interested foreign investor made the offer, he was
bound by it. In other words, the Government does not negotiate. This
does not occur in all cases, but the apparent lesson is do not make an
offer until you negotiate. If that is not possible, ask for more in the offer
than is expected and hope to come out with a reasonable deal if suggested
reductions are made. The latter strategy may be termed the law of the
market place, but it is not the best method to follow in order to obtain
the most rational and beneficial arrangement for both parties; it would
be better to negotiate. However, in order to negotiate advantageously, one
must have knowledge of what one is negotiating about, and knowledge is
not a free good, at least not in a commercial setting.
A particular Venezuelan technology transfer provision, contained
within Decree 63 (Art. 27), which limits new technology transfer con-
tracts to maximum terms of five years, deserves special mention. The
provision has been extended, by interpretation and practice, to cover
preexisting contracts as well. As noted earlier, this provision is more re-
strictive in Venezuela than in any other country in Latin America (with
the possible exceptions of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia) or the world,
including the socialist countries where contracts of fifteen years or more
are not uncommon. In Venezuela, it is beginning to be recognized that
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this rule could be quite costly for the country in cases where the tech.
nology is still fairly rare and therefore expensive, or where the technology
is part of a new industrial activity which requires several years or more
just to install and begin. Where this rule has not succeeded in dampening
interest altogether, technology suppliers are disaggregating their technology
offers, where the technology is still rare, to select what they feel would
be reasonable to sell in the first five year period rather than what they
can sell in the second five year period. This does not apply to licensing
since there can be no industrial property protection after the term of the
contract.
Where the technology is part of a new industrial activity, the whole
transaction may take on the characteristics of a turnkey operation (about
which derogatory remarks are constantly being made in Venezuela because
of a couple of monumentally bad experiences). The technology supplier
will be tempted, if not forced, to charge a high fee for the installation
since there will be only a year or two in which to recover the value of the
technology sold. From the point of view of the national investor, this could
be the worse rather than the better of both alternatives. The national in-
vestor will have to pay out a large sum before production begins, and
once begun, he will have no continuing guarantee that the technology
supplier will maintain a sufficient interest in maximizing the efficiency
and profitability of the production as would be the case if royalties or
adequate dividends were based thereon. In defense of Venezuela, it may
be notcd that Venezuela reportedly has been one of the stronger advocates
for substantially raising or eliminating altogether the 14% profit remit-
tance ceiling. However this would not help if the foreigner holds no equity
as might be the case in a number of the Government's key projects. It is
somewhat ironic in this regard that the Government entered into two year
renewable management, technology and supply contracts in both the
nationalized iron and petroleum industries. An analogy could be drawn
between these situations and the quasi-turnkey hypothesis above if one
assumes that the prior concessions are comparable to the latter. Thus, the
Government would be allowing itself the security of continuing technology
for royalty and service fees, which is now denied to ,he non-public sector,
but governments have never felt necessarily bound by the same rules
intended to govern others.
Finally, the temptation to comment on the provision in Decree 746
to the effect that a trademark licensor cannot prevent the licensee from
using a similar or like trademark after the contract expires cannot be
resisted. In Latin America, and undoubtedly in many other parts of the
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world, well-known trademarks often elicit double emotions: on the one
hand, there is resentment that brand X is dominant and foreign; whereas
on the other, that same brand X carries prestige and is of recognized and
appreciated quality. Because of the resentment, the first several drafts of
the Andean Group's Common Industrial Property Code, now Decision 85,
included a provision which would have prohibited the use of foreign trade-
marks by subregional producers beginning in 1977. However this pro-
vision was later stricken.
Nonetheless, of all the various technology provisions in the Vene-
zuelan legislation, the provision in Decree 746 seems the most radical in
terms of conventional practice. Of course, many trademarks are related to
the transfer (commercialization) of sophisticated technologies which, if
ended, would pose little threat that the product could be copied. How-
ever, how many food, beverage and pharmaceutical products, for example,
could be affected by this provision? The Superintendent has attempted
to reassure foreign trademark registrants by observing that only long-time
licensees could possibly be allowed to avail themselves of the new privi-
lege and that some protection against sublicensing abroad may be per-
mitted. But it may be asked under what legal authority is the Superin-
tendent making or, more importantly, providing the legal guarantee in
his reassuring statements. If the interpretation is correct that Decree 746
has now supplanted the old Industrial Property Law, which does (or did?)
protect trademarks, then one will search in vain for legal support for the
Superintendent's position. It is this kind of attitude which could most
dampen any enthusiasm for transferring many types of consumer tech-
nologies to Venezucla.
Except for the hard kinds of cases where there is a struggle involving
the interest of the country in having a particular technology and a sound
financial interest on the part of the potential supplier to get a fair return
for giving it up, Many attractive opportunities for a modest foreign par-
ticipation in Venezuela's current economic boom would appear to be
available. Both public and private entrepreneurs are becoming more
skillful and aggressive in going abroad to seek the special technological
ingredients needed for any specific project. Often they insist that the
foreign party take an equity position which it is felt will guarantee a
stronger, continued interest. Furthermore, the Government is becoming
more adept in international trade, investment and economic negotiations
which, in some cases, have helped the foreign investor secure a position,
albeit minority, in markets other than that in Venezuela. In this sense,
Venezuela has- begun to act like a budding capitalist (some of its closer
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neighbors have begun to say "imperialist") for which it will need foreign
help. By no means will this be limited to Latin American or other Third
World countries, as long as the appropriate bargains within the context
of the expressed principles can be reached. This is not to suggest that
any particular foreign investor or technology supplier or class or na-
tionality thereof should make the kinds of concessions demanded. Rather,
Argentinans, Mexicans, Europeans, and perhaps others who have less at
stake, may be more able and willing to take the risk. They may even be
more successful than traditional suppliers for reasons of affinity, and in
some areas, they may eventually be just as good.
What conclusions, then, can be drawn by the interested foreign in-
vestor or technology vendor? First, there is a new set of conditions in
Venezuela, positive in terms of the economy and perhaps restrictive in
terms of the law. Each investor or supplier, when approached by a
Venezuelan or vice versa, will have to decide whether the costs and bene-
fits offered or available, within the context of the particular business, are
favorable or not. In the last section of this article, several different ap-
proaches have been suggested which range from waiting and doing
nothing, to attempting to negotiate a final agreement before committing
one's position to paper. In any event, SIEX is not the only government
agency involved, although it has been the only one mentioned. There is a
growing number of governmental entities which will have to be consulted,
and whose approval will be required before reaching SEIX. It should be
recalled that SIEX is only a dependency of a ministry with limited rank
in the official hierarchy. Invariably, there are conflicting interests when
broad and major policies are implemented. Consequently, SIEX may not
always make its judgment prevail.
There are other strategies that firms can and do adopt. One which
is not uncommon is for firms to fill out all the required forms and write
the contracts as the governments demand. The firms ither know before-
hand that some of their claims can never be filled or hope that the
governments will create, by virtue of their sound leadership and ad-
ministration, the conditions necessary to allow the companies to realize
their ambitions. In some cases, there is no choice; for example, one
country in which a particular technology is licensed may prohibit im-
ports as an official policy, whereas another country registering a new
license for the same technology may dictate that exports cannot be re-
stricted. In other situations, the economic conditions may be so un-
certain, even in the immediate future, that an investor cannot possibly
know whether he will be able to export or not, how much he will pro-
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duce, at what price, and with how much employment. Can one believe
that the Andean Group integration program will be fulfilled - the law
says it will be- or that some other promised trade negotiation will be
successfully concluded? One cannot admire a company which would
knowingly exaggerate its claims. However, the questions can become very
fine when it comes to actually knowing what to claim as the prowess of
one's investment benefits or technology.
If there is little that is certain in the foreign investment context in
Latin America, perhaps solace can be taken from the following. Both
Governmental and foreign investors or suppliers should continue to ad-
here to their basic principles; no one will be served if inexpensive, out-
moded and inappropriate technologies are transferred to Latin America.
World market prices or the true development or commercial value should
be charged. At the same time, greater efforts should be made to train the
recipients and to help serve the aspirations of the recipient countries. In-
vestors and suppliers should attempt to better understand the legitimate
development goals of Latin America and to realize that rapid progress
can be made, but in small steps. On the other side, the problems are
plentiful and diverse. Nonetheless, it would help if a beginning could be
made in defining more precisely the kinds, qualities and end purposes of
the technologies which are needed for the priority sectors, who has them,
and how they might be transferred. This does not mean abandoning
principles, it only means being more pragmatic. For better or for worse,
the defining and organizing may result in greater internal centralization
of the economy. In some ways, this is ironic. Venezuela is increasingly in
a position to be more capitalistic in its external affairs. It may as a result
of this irony that Venezuela will reach a satisfactory level of development
more rapidly, which appears to be the only real solution.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
As mentioned in the author's note, several events concerning the
Andean Group and Venezuela have taken place since the article went to
press. These events are discussed below and should be compared with the
section of the article entitled "Recent Events Regarding the Possible Modi-
fication of Decision 24."
The most significant of the recent events was the approval of De-
cision 103 by the Commission of the Andean Group on October 30, 1976.
Decision 103 modifies Decision 24 as follows:
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1) Art. 1, containing the definitions used in Decision 24, has
b en rearranged for purposes of clarity, but the only real addition is
the equating of subregional investment ("the investments of property
of subregional investors") with national investment when certain
conditions are met.
2) Art. 4, of Decision 24, was modified to permit the partici-
pation of foreign capital in national or mixed companies if the pur-
pose is to increase capital and the company continues to be at least a
mixed company. Previously, the percentage of foreign versus na-
tional ownership had to remain unchanged.
3) The percentage of the registered capital base which the
foreign investor may reinvest without prior authorization was raised
from 5% to 7% in Art. 13.
4) Art. 17, regarding access to internal credit, was liberalized
so that now foreign investors may have access to short and medium-
term local credit which is defined as up to three years.
5) On the matter of transformation, the new operative date is
now January 1, 1974 for beginning the transformation period (15 or
20 years) and for defining those foreign companies which were pre-
existing within the terms of Art. 28. As this does not modify Art.
30 regarding the obligation of new foreign enterprises (those estab-
lished after July 1, 1971) to transform, it must be understood that
a foreign company established in the subregion between July 1,
1971 and January 1, 1974, which entered into a transformation agree-
ment as a prior condition, is still bound thereby. Likewise, there is no
change in the date of decision for preexisting foreign companies not
obligated to transform, but which decide to do so to take advantage of
the liberation program. That date remained unchanged for three years
following the entry into effect of Decision 24. This is somewhat aca-
demic though, as the Commission by interpretation, has declared that
if such a company wishes to transform after the three year period has
passed, it may still do so, hut that the transformation period would
be accordingly shortened. Now, -with this harmonization of the date
for transformation, the allowable period has been extended slightly
even for these companies; that is, they could now make this decision
by the end of this year (1976) and not be prejudiced by a shorter
transformation period. Of course, this will not affect Venezuela at
all as its entry into the Group only took effect on this new date.
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To implement this change, for foreign companies which volun.
tarily entered into a transformation agreement, Transitory Article A
of Decision 103 provides that such foreign companies "may" now
agree with the administrative body that the period agreed upon is
to commence as of this date.
Also related to transformation, Art. 31 was modified to permit
the transformation to occur through an increase in capital subscribed
by national or subregional shareholders, instead of limiting the
process to the sale of foreign shares as was previously implied.
6) Art. 34 was modified to permit foreign investments engaged
in tourism under the same conditions as foreign companies which ex-
port 80% or more of their production to third country markets.
7) One of the most significant modifications to Decision 24 is to
Art. 37 which raises the profit remittance limitation from 14% to
20% and allows the countries to raise it even higher, communicating
such decision to the Commission.
8) A new article to Decision 24 allows the investments made
by international governmental entities to be counted as "neutral" in-
vestments which are not included in the calculation to determine
the classification of the particular company. Finally, an article pro-
viding that the Group may accord special treatment for non-member
Latin American investments was added.
On December 1, 1976, the Commission of the Andean Group concluded
its XXIst Period of Ordinary Sessions. During that period, it approved De-
cisions 109 and 110, again modifying Decision 24. Decision 109 modi-
fies Decision 24 by (1) further clarifying the neutral character of in-
vestments made by public international institutions, (2) allowing each
country individually to waive the one year residency requirement for
foreign residents who wish to have national investor status by renouncing
their right to repatriate capital and remit earnings, and (3) allowing
Bolivia. and Ecuador to apply a more liberal treatment than provided in
Decision 24 to foreign investments made in primarily agricultural ac-
tivities. Decision 110 permits investments made by mixed companies
(those with a maximum of 49% foreign equity) under Decision 24 to be
calculated as national or foreign in the same percentage as is their re-
spective equity in the investing company.
All of the modifications approved by the Andean Group Commission
must now be implemented by the appropriate national legislation in each
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country. Though this will not be complete until sometime in 1977, it
might be expected that each country will begin to apply these modifica-
tions as soon as they become part of its national law.
In addition to the Andean Group developments, Venezuela has been
studying possible modifications to its internal regulations which imple-
ment Decision 24. First, a way apparently is being sought to exempt
foreign companies which deal in high technology product lines from the
obligation which requires, according to Decree 62, their transformation
into national companies. Second, the maximum term of duration of
transfer of technology or technical assistance contracts, as established
under Decree 63, may be extended from five to ten years. Since several
competing proposals have been made, however, the exact nature of these
modifications will not be known until they are issued by presidential
decree.
NOTES
IThe Andean Group is a subregional customs union formed in May 1969 by
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Venezuela adhered to the Group, or Pact
(the formal name is the Acuerdo de Cartagena) in February 1973, though its entry
did not become effective until December 31, 1973. One of the Group's principal
features is a nationalistic policy toward foreign investment and technology transfer
which is commonly known as Decision 24 of the Andean Group Commission. This
legislation was adopted in Venezuela by Decrees 62 and 63 of April 1974. These
laws will be discussed in greater detail below.
2 1n addition to Decrees 62 and 63, Venezuela has approved the following:
Decree 746 (February 1975) containing significant new restrictions regarding tech-
nology contracts, the Foreign Enterprise Transformation Law (August 1975) which
governs the sale of foreign held shares to national investors, and Decree 1225
(October 1975) which governs foreign investment related to the petroleum industry.
Besides these measures enacted as decrees or laws there are a number of other
ministerial rulings of implementation or interpretation. Also, several new measures
have been proposed covering such areas as the conversion of foreign companies
engaged primarily in commercial activities but which desire to convert into manu-
facturing enterprises, obligatory actions intended to encourage technology transfer,
and at the subregional level the discussions being held to regulate Decision 24. All
of these measures, or proposals, are discussed in this article.
3At the close of the Commission meeting held in early April 1976, such modifica-
tion appeared more likely. It was decided to allow Chile to resell to foreign investors
those companies nationalized by the Allende administration and still under govern-
ment control (Decision 97). Also, agreement was reached in principle to push
forward with the prompt modification of some of the Decision 24 provisions to bring
the code more in line with current "international economic realities."
4For an English translation of Decision 24, see 11 I.L.M. 126 (1972). For
Decision 70, Arts. 33 and 34, which modify Decision 24, see 12 id. 349 (1973).
5For an English translation of Decision 84, see 13 id. at 1478 (1974).
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6For an English translation of Decision 85, see id. at 1489.
7The Minister of Development, Jos Ignacio Casal, who has direct jurisdiction
over foreign investment and technology transfer, stated in an interview on March 29,
1976, that the necessary studies were being completed, that Decision 85 would soon
be approved by the Congress and that it would change significantly existing Vene-
zuelan legislation in this area (El Nacional, March 30, 1976). Decision 85 as it is
written would modify the current Venezuelan Industrial Property Law of 1955, but
how "significantly" will be known only when the new legislation is approved by the
Congress.
8GACETA OFICIAL, Nov. 1, 1976, No. 1620 Extraordinario.
9For an English translation of Decision 46, see 11 IL.M. 357 (1972).
lOThis Decision established the norms for the formation of Andean multinational
companies formed by investors of at least two Andean countries in which neither
could hold less than 9% of the equity, but which could allow up to a 40% foreign
(non-Andean) participation.
itGACETA OFICIAL, Apr. 29, 1974, No. 1650 Extraordinario.
12Reportedly, the decision has now been made to transfer SIEX from the Min-
istry of Development to the Ministry of Finance, presumably on the grounds that
foreign investment is more appropriately a foreign exchange matter, and that the
national policy in this regard is set at the presidential and congressional levels and
not at that of a particular ministry. Though the necessary decree to effectuate this
change has not been issued, it is supposed to occur on January 1, 1977, and is
reportedly already being carried out in practice.
13d., Mar. 1, 1975, No. 30635.
141d., Aug. 21, 1975, No. 30774.
Sd., Oct. 21, 1975, No. 30827.
161t is this provision (Art. 11) which in particular has been questioned on
constitutional grounds.
17This definition has been continually reiterated by SIEX, both formally and
informally, and may be considered as "quasi-law" though it never has been embodied
in a decree or otherwise issued in any other form which has been published.
1sIt is more likely that this requisite would be demanded in order for tol
manufacturing to qualify within the 51% gross sales of nationally produced goods.
t 9Domiciliation. is required by the Venezuelan Constitution (Art. 126) for work
performed by. foreign companies for ministries and many government owned entities.
20Decree 869, GACETA OFICIAL, May 22, 1975, No. 1742; Decree 870,, id. in
No. 1743.
2 1Piroposal No. 59, Arts. 34 and 35, Dec. 27, 1974:
22 Decree 63 specifically refers to "new" technology contracts. Hence there
appears to be little legal authority-for extending this rule to cover prior contracts.
23However, Colombia, by internal regulation of its Royalties Committee, has
established a three year rule, though assurances regarding renovation have been
easier to obtain.
24 Brazil has been limiting technology contracts in some cases to five years and
in general has ,been tending toward a. more restrictive policy. Now, in Argentina
following the anti-Peronist coup greater flexibility will again be allowed.
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t t Translations are by the author.
26 GACETA OFICIAL, Dec. 2, 1975, No. 30861.
2 7Equally of interest on this point is the contradiction, at least in policy,
between the five year provision of Decree 63, and Decision 85 and the Industrial
Property Law of 1955, neither of which imply such a short time period (Decision 85
would permit the granting of patents for up to ten years and unlimited periods in
the case of trademarks).
2sAt best it will probably be some time before SIEX or any other governmental
agency attempts to implement this, but of course there may be other forms of pres-
sure regarding choice of technology.
2 9This may occur specifically when a foreign resident wishes to be treated like
a national investor by accepting the same conditions for removing foreign exchange
from the country (Art. 1 of Decision 24; Art. 21 of Decree 63). As Venezuela has
no exchange controls, and abundant foreign exchange, for the present this implies no
sacrifice as it would in Chile, Colombia or Peru, all of which have strict exchange
control.
30A few examples will suffice to illustrate this point. In the country's new auto-
motive plan, under which national value added is to reach 90% by 1985, motor
blocks are required to produce even before the forging and founding facilities are
to be installed (supposedly the unfinished blocks will be imported and machined in
the country). In the few basic research centers in the country there has been a
tendency to finance research on processes or final products which already exist and
could be acquired, including the inherent learning, at much more modest costs.
Finally, when a world prestigious research institute offered to the Government a
proposed study on technology policy alternatives the reply was that "there is nothing
wrong with the policies, all that is lacking is the technology."
3tThis concept had been used before, significantly by the current Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Ram6n Excovar Salom. See, e.g., R. SALOM, AMEREcA LATINA: JUEaO
SIN FRO TEAs, 70 (1973).
3 2Since the nationalization of the petroleum industry on January 1, 1976, some
of this confidence has begun to fade. First, the ex-petroleum concessionaires agreed
to purchase only three-fourths of what they had been exporting and as petroleum
exports account for over 90% of the country's foreign exchange and over 80% of
government revenues, this caused an embarrassing budget squeeze. Second, it was
becoming more apparent that the many major capital investment projects were too
ambitious in terms of public administration, human resources, financial capital and
technology, and that there would not be the rapid transformation which had been
expected. Next, the country continues to suffer from an an inflation which is rela-
tively mild (roughly 15%) in world terms, but which has caused adjustment shock-
waves and dangerous speculation in some sectors. Finally, though one could mention
other danger signals, the sometimes arbitrary, drastic measures adopted by the
Government in the area of economic decisions, such as price controls and the expro-
priation of Owens-Illinois in April 1976, do not help to generate feelings of political
or investor security.
33 As indicated in the preface to this article, Decision 24 has been partially
modified, incorporating, or rejecting, some of the points noted in this section. How-
ever, the Secretariat, at least, continues to urge a common set of regulations to
Decision 24 and therefore some of these proposed changes may still be relevant. This
description is also thought to provide a useful indication of the differences of opinion
among the member countries on this important question.
34This was contained in Decision 97, which now with the withdrawal of Chile
has become superfluous.
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35This office has been designated the Office of Control of Foreign Enterprises
and Investments. El Universal, Nov. 2, 1976.
36This judgment, like many in this area, is subject to political shifts which are
sometimes hard to foresee. Thus, while what is stated in the text is usually the case,
the Committee on several occasions has overruled the Superintendent. On such occa-
sions, the Committee's rulings have usually been on the restrictive side.
37These were especially the Foreign Trade Institute (ICE), nominally under
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Scientific and Technological
Research Council (CONICIT), directly ascribed to the President.
38The Government finally approved the current Five-Year Plan, which should
have been adopted near the start of the present administration which took office in
March 1974, though this was delayed until February 1976. However, as in the case
of most such plans, it provides few guidelines in this area for the Superintendency.
39 0n the other hand, if the original contract date is not unreasonably beyond
an additional five years, and there is little question about the value of the technology,
the original date could probably be left intact.
40By December 1976 roughly half of these preexisting contracts had been ap-
proved and registered with many having been given a new beginning date of June 30,
1976. While this was the final date for presentation of these reformed contracts, no
explanation has been given for choosing this date as opposed to the actual date of
registration, which in most cases is several months later.
4 tIn several cases such consultations, particularly on the amount of the royalty
requested, are known to have taken place.
4ZThis is not to suggest that the oil or iron ore concessionaires, or other foreign
companies which have been nationalized, were satisfied with the compensation paid.
On the contrary, the policy of the government appears to be to offer compensation
very near the book value, but then to offer additional inducements and compensation
to maintain managerial or technological inputs from the foreign company. This
allows the government to appear to have negotiated a favorable financial settlement
while at the same time establishing a new contractual relationship between the
country and the foreign company.
4 3These two possibilities are actively under study with the Venezuelan Develop-
ment Corporation which has announced that it intends to perform just such an inter-
mediary function. Likewise, the private sector banks are readying their trust depart-
ments to participate in the transformation process, if and when they are allowed
by the government to do so.
441t now appears that this legislation will soon be modified in Peru. The workers
may still be entitled to receive a direct ownership share, but this will probably he
reduced to no more than 33%.
4 53 ee. Memoria Anual of the Ministry of Development for 1975, report of SIEX.
46A related problem has arisen in some cases of preexisting technology contracts
with a local partner where the local partner has refused, overtly or covertly, to
register the technology contract and even in some instances has stopped paying the
royalties due. This obviously puts the supplier in a difficult position as eventually
(supposedly after June 30, 1976), if the contract is not duly registered, it will not
be legally valid and, therefore, no payments can be demanded. The Superintendent
has said that he would take a very dim view of permitting his countrymen to take
unfair advantage of this legislation to avoid their legally valid responsibilities. How-
ever, at the same time, no contract is valid until approved and registered, which
means that the Superintendent also has to approve of that particular technology
transfer under the terms expressed in the contract.
